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ABSTRACT MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
The United States has adopted a policy of calculated
ambiguity regarding the role of nuclear weapons in response
to a potential chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attack.
Many factors affect decisions about the role nuclear weapons
play in U.S. counterproliferation strategy. This thesis
describes the policy of calculated ambiguity and offers some
observations about its prospects and pitfalls.
The thesis presents evidence that suggests nuclear
weapons could play a positive role in the U.S.
counterproliferation strategy, at least in some
circumstances. It also explains how such a role could
conflict with the U.S. nonproliferation strategy. Such a
role would also violate the nuclear taboo and be seen by a
majority of countries as illegal and immoral. The United
States has chosen a policy of calculated ambiguity in an
attempt to retain the deterrent value of nuclear weapons
without paying the political, legal, and moral costs of
explicit reliance on nuclear weapons to deter the use of
CBW. This may have short-term benefits, but ultimately may
damage the national interest.
VI
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During the Cold War, fear of Soviet nuclear weapons led
the United States to adopt a clearly articulated policy of
nuclear deterrence. The end of the Cold War and improved
relations with Russia have significantly reduced the
immediacy of the threat posed by the Russian nuclear
arsenal. New threats based on different types of weapons
have emerged: the threats posed by chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) . In contrast to the Cold War, the United
States has not adopted an unambiguous nuclear deterrence
policy to respond to this threat. It has instead adopted a
policy of "calculated ambiguity" in defining its response to
CBW. This policy of calculated ambiguity refers to the U.S.
position of neither ruling in nor ruling out the use of any
weapon in responding to CBW attacks . This thesis examines
explanations for the U.S. policy of calculated ambiguity.
Initially, the policy of calculated ambiguity may seem
to provide a flexible response to CBW. This is not the
case, however. This thesis identifies the drawbacks of the
policy and exposes the lack of flexibility a policy of
calculated ambiguity could ultimately lead to.
Many factors affect decisions about the role nuclear
weapons play in U.S. counterproliferation strategy. Nuclear
weapons, at least in some circumstances, provide significant
IX
deterrent capability vis-a-vis chemical and biological
threats. In some circumstances, moreover, they could also
offer the best operational way to destroy chemical and
biological weapons facilities. However, the use of nuclear
weapons for deterrence of CBW threats (or destruction of CBW
facilities) has not been embraced as a part of U.S.
counterproliferation policy. This is not because of
operational difficulties associated with relying on nuclear
weapons to carry out these counterproliferation missions.
Instead, the nuclear taboo explains why decision-makers are
reluctant to use nuclear weapons operationally in any but
the most extreme circumstances. The negative impact that
explicit reliance on nuclear weapons would have on the
nonproliferation strategy of the United States provides
disincentives for publicly articulating arguments for using
a nuclear option for counterproliferation. Finally, the
judgements many states have expressed about the legality and
morality of the use of nuclear weapons limit the degree to
which the United States can publicly rely on nuclear weapons
as a response to chemical and biological threats
.
The combination of these positive and negative
incentives to rely on nuclear weapons in its counterprolif-
eration strategy has led the United States to choose a
policy of calculated ambiguity. This policy of calculated
ambiguity does not prevent the United States from enjoying
the positive attributes nuclear weapons provide because it
does not rule out the possibility that nuclear weapons could
play a role in the U.S. response to CBW. The policy of
calculated ambiguity also may advance the deterrence goals
of the United States by providing an element of uncertainty
in the mind of any potential adversary considering a CBW
attack.
Unfortunately, the policy of calculated ambiguity has
two basic flaws. The first is that it has been chosen for
the wrong reasons. Instead of a rational decision, based on
sound analysis of all the options, calculated ambiguity
appears to be based on national decision-makers' inability
to come to grips with their own indecision. Secondly, this
policy could entail significant negative implications for
the national interest if it is ever tested by an adversary's
CBW attack. The decision-maker relying on a policy of
calculated ambiguity would face a difficult choice in these
circumstances. For the first time, he would have to decide
whether it is more important to obtain the benefits of using
nuclear weapons in response to such an attack, or whether
the negative aspects of a nuclear response would outweigh
any gains. Pressures on national decision-makers could lead





During the Cold War, fear of Soviet nuclear weapons led
the United States to adopt a clearly articulated policy of
nuclear deterrence. The end of the Cold War and improved
relations with Russia have significantly reduced the
immediacy of the threat posed by the Russian nuclear
arsenal. New threats based on different types of weapons
have emerged: the threats posed by chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) . In contrast to the Cold War, the United
States has not adopted an unambiguous nuclear deterrence
policy to respond to this threat. It has instead adopted a
policy of "calculated ambiguity" in defining its response to
CBW. This policy of calculated ambiguity refers to the U.S.
position of neither ruling in nor ruling out the use of any
weapon in responding to CBW attacks. This thesis examines
explanations for the U.S. policy of calculated ambiguity.
Initially, the policy of calculated ambiguity may seem
to provide a flexible response to CBW. This is not the
case, however. This thesis identifies the drawbacks of the
policy and exposes the lack of flexibility a policy of
calculated ambiguity could ultimately lead to.
A. WHY HAS THE UNITED STATES CHOSEN A POLICY OF CALCULATED
AMBIGUITY TO DETER THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS?
Recently, the United States has increased its
investment, including research and development, in response
to an emerging chemical and biological weapons threat.
These initiatives have included improved battlefield
detection, identification and decontamination equipment and
training for local, state and federal agencies in responding
to terrorist use of CBW. 1 These efforts reflect the fact
that the battlefield of the future, whether it be overseas
or at home, is one in which CBW might be used. The goal, as
stated in the latest edition of the Department of Defense's
report on the Counterproliferation Initiative, is to be able
to "fight and win under conditions where an adversary may
use asymmetric means, thereby demonstrating to any potential
aggressor that the risks incurred from using NBC weapons
would far outweigh any advantages gained." 2 This statement
summarizes the "deterrence by denial" response to the threat
1 See United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, D.C.,
November 1997), for the specific aspects of the Counterproliferation
Initiative
.
2 United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, D.C.,
November 1997) , 53
.
of CBW. While the document makes passing reference to the
need for "a range of nuclear and conventional response
capabilities,
"
3 it concentrates on how the United States is
working to prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
,
primarily chemical and
biological weapons (CBW) , and on what the United States must
do to operate in an environment in which such weapons may be
used. This document implies that the United States is
relying primarily on a strategy of deterrence by denial to
respond to the threat of CBW. 4
The actions taken by the United States in support of
this strategy of deterrence by denial are appropriate.
Given the significant risk of facing CBW in any future
conflict, such measures would be required no matter what
strategy the United States used to respond to the threat
posed by CBW. What is puzzling is that the United States is
focusing almost solely on a deterrence by denial strategy.
The nuclear arsenal of the United States appears to offer
two additional options for the U.S. strategy, preemption and
3 Ibid.
4 Department of Defense Special Assistant for Counterproliferation,
Peter Lavoy confirmed this reliance on the deterrence by denial strategy
in a conversation with the author in February 1998.
3
deterrence by threat of punishment. 5 This is especially the
case given that use 6 or threatened use of nuclear weapons no
longer engenders the fear of cataclysmic nuclear holocaust
or even significant nuclear retaliation. 7 The situation
raises the question: Given the extensive potential benefits
and relatively low costs, at least on a prima facie basis,
why does the United States not explicitly rely on its
nuclear arsenal to respond to the threat posed by chemical
and biological weapons? Why instead has the United States
chosen to rely mainly on a policy of calculated ambiguity?
This thesis answers these questions by investigating the
determinants of U.S. policy.
5 Deterrence by denial and deterrence by threat of punishment are not
mutually exclusive. In fact, they complement each other. If an
aggressor faces a situation in which he gains little military advantage
through CBW and faces devastating punishment in response, he is more
likely to be deterred than if he faced only one or the other.
6 For purposes of this thesis, unless specifically stated, "use" of
nuclear weapons refers to the actual detonation of a nuclear warhead for
political and/or military purposes against an adversary. "Non-use"
refers to the lack of operational employment of nuclear weapons since
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
While scenarios leading to a nuclear holocaust are still entirely
plausible, especially if the vital interests of the Russian Federation
or the People's Republic of China are threatened, the end of the Cold
War and relatively cordial relations between the United States and the
Russian Federation have significantly reduced the number of
circumstances which could lead to a nuclear holocaust. It is unlikely
that Russia or China would risk nuclear war over a limited United States
nuclear attack on a "rogue" nation, especially if that attack was in
response to WMD use by the "rogue" nation.
B. IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS
CHOSEN A POLICY OF CALCULATED AMBIGUITY
Understanding the answer to this puzzle is important
for two reasons. The first is that the proliferation of
WMD, especially CBW, is one of the most pressing concerns
facing United States security planners today. The 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that defense
planners must assume that the use of chemical and biological
weapons will be a "likely condition of future warfare." 8 If
this is indeed the case, it is vital that American responses
to CBW be properly constructed. Understanding the reasons
why the current strategy of calculated ambiguity has been
chosen will allow analysts and policy makers to estimate
whether it meets U.S. and allied security requirements.
This thesis identifies two significant flaws in the policy
of calculated ambiguity: it has been chosen for the wrong
reasons, and entails significant dangers to the national
interest if ever tested. By identifying these flaws it
might be possible to prevent damage to the national
interest
.
William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review [document
on-line], May 1997; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr;
Internet; accessed 15 July 1998.
5
U.S. nuclear deterrence policies also should not be
formed without reference to other security issues such as
non-proliferation and arms control. Such issues are
interrelated, and decisions taken to advance one policy may
actually damage another. This thesis identifies some of
these inter-relationships in the areas of nuclear strategy,
counterproliferation, nonproliferation, domestic and
international public opinion and politics, as well as
international law. This thesis is intended to advance
understanding of these inter-relationships and to identify
the determinants of U.S. policy in the critical domain of
responding to CBW threats
.
C. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS
Chapter II makes use of a realist perspective to
examine why some analysts might argue that nuclear weapons
should play a more prominent role in the U.S.
counterproliferation strategy. The possible use of nuclear
weapons to deter or preempt the use of CBW is the focus of
Chapter II. Evidence is presented which suggests that
nuclear weapons could offer significant contributions to the
U.S. ability to respond to the threat of CBW.
Chapters III and IV examine possible reasons why the
nuclear option is not being pursued more vigorously by
American policymakers in contemplating counterproliferation
strategies. Chapter III examines political reasons why this
is so, including the theory of a nuclear taboo and the
proposition that increased reliance on nuclear weapons would
conflict with the nonproliferation strategy adopted by the
United States
.
Chapter IV examines the extent to which legal and moral
concerns limit the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.
counterproliferation strategy. It also reviews evidence of
international opinions regarding the legality and morality
of the use of nuclear weapons . The chapter includes a brief
analysis of the theory of the Just War and its requirements
of discrimination, proportionality, and necessity. The 1996
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion
regarding the legality of the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons offers an opportunity to examine
interpretations by leading international jurists regarding
the issue. Chapters III and IV suggest that significant
political, legal, and moral concerns limit the extent to
which nuclear weapons can be featured prominently in United
States counterproliferation strategy.
Chapter V consists of a case study of the U.S. policy
of calculated ambiguity regarding the use of nuclear weapons
against CBW proliferants . It identifies official
declaratory policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear weapons states. This policy places
significant limits on the role nuclear weapons can play in
counterproliferation policy. The chapter also identifies
inconsistencies between this declaratory policy and actual
practice. It proposes an explanation of why this is the
case
.
The concluding chapter identifies how the arguments
about the use of nuclear weapons to deter CBW actually shape
U.S. policy regarding the role of nuclear weapons in
counterproliferation strategy. The thesis concludes that
there is no clear policy regarding the role of nuclear
weapons in U.S. counterproliferation strategy. Political,
legal, and ethical considerations limit the extent to which
nuclear weapons can be discussed, much less used, as tools
for counterproliferation. Official declaratory policy
reflects these concerns. However, actual practice
demonstrates that, at least in some cases, concern for the
national interest has caused policy makers to hedge toward a
counterproliferation role for nuclear weapons. This hedging
has significant implications. While ambiguity regarding
U.S. nuclear policy may enhance deterrence, it may also
handicap policy makers. Ambiguity regarding nuclear policy
may be calculated to keep potential adversaries unsure of
what action the United States would take in response to a
CBW attack. Ambiguity also may reflect the reluctance of
policy makers to consider the circumstances under which
nuclear weapons would be used.
Since August 1945 the United States has been fortunate
in avoiding a situation in which it must choose between an
apparent need to use nuclear weapons operationally, and the
political, legal, and moral incentives to refrain from such
action. If the necessity for choice ever were to occur, a
lack of prior planning and careful thought could lead to an
unwise snap decision damaging to the national interest. The
worst time to confront planners and policy makers with this
kind of issue is during a crisis.
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II. ARGUMENTS FOR A NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO CBW THREATS
All our adult lives, we have lived with the threat
of nuclear holocaust hanging over our heads like a
dark cloud, threatening the existence of all
mankind.
Now with the end of the Cold War, that dark
nuclear cloud has drifted away, and the whole
world breathes easier in the sunlight. 9
With the departure of the "dark nuclear cloud" of the
Cold War, the United States faces a security environment in
which a nuclear holocaust seems very unlikely. The risk
during the Cold War that any operational use of nuclear
weapons would provoke a nuclear war was one of the factors
that prevented the United States from operationally using
nuclear weapons to achieve specific political or military
objectives. 10 During the Cold War fear of a global thermo-
nuclear war prevented U.S. policy makers from considering
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons without
9 Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Remarks
Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the
Henry L. Stimson Center 20 September 1994," News Release No. 535-94, 20
September 1994.
10 This is in contrast to broader, political uses of nuclear weapons.
It is generally recognized that the United States has used and continues
to use nuclear weapons to deter similarly armed adversaries, to
discourage proliferation by providing extended deterrence guarantees, to
strengthen alliance cohesion through consultation mechanisms and
programs of cooperation, and implicitly to coerce nuclear-armed and non-
nuclear adversaries in the interests of crisis management and war-
termination.
11
considering the consequences of provoking a Soviet response
leading to nuclear holocaust. This situation prevented
nuclear weapons from being used against other states for any
purpose other than deterrence of attack. 11
Today the situation has changed. While the potential
threats posed by the nuclear arsenals of the Russian
Federation and the Peoples' Republic of China are not
ignored, neither are they considered a significant immediate
threat. 12 The international situation might allow limited
uses of nuclear weapons without fear of an automatic
escalation to global thermo-nuclear war. Limited use of a
nuclear weapon or weapons ( taking into account requirements
of necessity, proportionality and discrimination) in
response to CBW attacks by "rogue" states would probably not
result in a nuclear response by another nuclear power.
11 NATO plans regarding employment of nuclear weapons in the defense of
western Europe and the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons in South Korea
were not specifically aimed at deterring the use of other nuclear
weapons. However, NATO and U.S. nuclear planning in Europe and Korea
was part of deterrence policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its allies
in a context of possible escalation to large-scale nuclear war. The
point is that today this is not the case. The United States has the
hypothetical option of considering the use of nuclear weapons in
specific instances without being overly concerned about provoking a
nuclear holocaust.
12 The statement by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and
Threat Reduction, Edward L. Warner, to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 31 March 1998 presents the
Clinton Administration's view on this subject.
12
This situation has opened several strategic
alternatives not previously available to the United States.
The area in which nuclear weapons could perhaps play the
most significant role is in dealing with the proliferation
of chemical and biological weapons.
A. POTENTIAL NUCLEAR ROLES FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION
1 . Deterrence
Traditionally the United States has relied on response
in kind as its deterrence strategy. American biological and
chemical weapons existed solely to allow the United States
to respond in kind should another nation choose to use such
weapons. While the United States maintained a flexible
response option, 13 response in kind has been an important
part of the American deterrence posture. American
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) , and the removal of CBW
from the U.S. arsenal, now prevent any response in kind to a
biological or chemical weapons attack. This leaves two
possible responses: conventional or nuclear retaliation.
13 NATO declaratory policy during the Cold War relied heavily on nuclear
weapons to deter Soviet chemical and biological attack. David Gompert,
Kenneth Watmann, and Dean Wilkening, U.S. Nuclear Declaratory Policy:
the Question of First Use (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 8.
13
Conventional response may be adequate to deter chemical
and biological threats in some cases . The advances in
conventional forces exemplified by the so-called Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA) are impressive. As U.S.
operations during the 1990-1991 Gulf War showed,
conventional weapons have tremendous potential. It is quite
possible that adversaries will so fear conventional
retaliation, that they will be deterred from using chemical
and biological weapons. 14
While a conventional response to CBW attack may be a
sufficient deterrent in some cases, this might not always be
the case. The Gulf War again provides some clues. There is
strong evidence to suggest that Saddam Hussein did not fear
American conventional retaliation, but that fear of American
and Israeli nuclear retaliation deterred him from using
chemical and biological weapons in the 1990-91 Gulf War.
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz- and Iraqi defector,
General Wafic Al Sammarai, have both stated that fear of
nuclear retaliation kept Saddam Hussein from using chemical
and biological weapons against coalition forces and the
14 Of course the overwhelming conventional superiority of the United
States might lead them to the conclusion that some asymmetric means to
compete with the United States is required. Chemical and biological
weapons are often cited as such a threat.
14
state of Israel. 15 UNSCOM administrator Rolf Ekeus reports
that Aziz and other Iraqi officials confirmed that Iraq
loaded three types of biological agents into 200 missiles
and bombs in December 1990. These weapons were not used
because the "devastating response" to any CBW attack
promised by the United States was perceived to mean a
nuclear attack. 16 While there is no way to determine
conclusively the validity of these reports, they seem to be
plausible. If the only reason Saddam Hussein failed to
exploit his significant chemical and biological arsenal was
because he feared a nuclear response, then the idea that
nuclear weapons should be used to deter CBW attack is one
that merits serious consideration.
2. Destruction of CBW Facilities
Nuclear weapons also have been suggested as possible
means to destroy a potential enemy's chemical and biological
weapons facilities. This destruction could come either in
the course of a conflict, as with the coalition strikes
against Iraqi CBW capabilities during the 1990-91 Gulf War,
or as a single counterproliferation action similar to
15Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington,
Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 81-87.
16R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. Says Iraqis Prepared Germ Weapons in Gulf War;
Baghdad Balked, Fearing U.S. Nuclear Retaliation," The Washington Post,
26 August 1995, sec. A, p. 01.
15
Israel's attack on the Al Tuwaitha nuclear reactor at
Osirak, Iraq. While all previous cases of destruction of
WMD (both CBW and nuclear) facilities have been conducted
with conventional munitions, 17 a case can be made that some
future contingencies could require nuclear weapons. The
suspected Libyan chemical weapons plant at Tarhunah is a
case in point. This complex is located in a tunnel, deeply-
buried beneath 18-3 Om of concrete and sandstone. 18 The
tunnels that make up the complex are estimated to be between
200 and 450 feet long. Just inside the entrance they
diverge around a solid rock wall. 19 This prevents Tomahawk
cruise missiles or other weapons with similar trajectories
from flying down the length of the tunnels to destroy the
suspected chemical weapons facility inside. Moreover, the
top cover limits the effectiveness of vertically dropped
17 Counterproliferation strikes since the Second World War include
Allied efforts to hamper the German atomic bomb program throughout the
war by sabotage and bombing; U.S. bombing of the Japanese atomic weapons
research laboratory on 13 April 1945; Iran's unsuccessful air attack on
Iraq's Osirak reactor on 30 September 1980; Israel's successful attack
on the same reactor on 7 June 1981; Iraq's destruction of Iran's reactor
in Bushehr in 1984 and 1985; and the Coalition's campaign to destroy the
Iraqi WMD complex in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Barry R. Schneider,
Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-
Proliferation, McNair Paper 41 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University, 1995), 8-9.
18 Estimates of top cover at Tarhunah vary, even within the same
publishing group. Jane's Intelligence Review cites the high end, while
Defence Weekly cites the lower figure. Robert Waller, "Libyan CW Raises
the Issue of Pre-emption," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 November 1996,
527. "US Concepts Target Counterforce Mission," Janes Defence Weekly,
12 November 1997, 45.
19 Waller, 538.
16
penetrating weapons. The most advanced conventional deep
penetration munition in the American arsenal, the GBU-2 8/B,
is capable of penetrating only 6m of reinforced concrete. 20
While several initiatives to improve U.S. conventional
capabilities in this area are underway, no conventional
means of destroying Tarhunah or similarly protected targets
from the air currently exists or is likely to be available
for several years
.
Targets such as Tarhunah are envisioned for the latest
upgrade to the American nuclear weapons stockpile, the B-
61/11. This weapon, which is essentially a B-61/7 nuclear
gravity bomb that has been given a modified case and fusing
system, is said to be capable of penetrating from 2 to 15m
of top cover (depending on the medium) . 21 This performance
is similar to that of conventional penetrators: however, the
yield of .3 to 3 00KT22 uses the ground itself to produce a
shock coupling effect. This effect allows it to destroy




20 Ibid. , 527.
21
"US Nuclear bomb passes final drops tests," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1
April 1998, 5.
22 Ibid.
23 Jeff Erlich, "Bunker-Busting Bomb Prompts U.S. Discord," Defense
News, 24 February 1997, 1.
17
The ability of nuclear weapons to "hold at risk" a wide
range of deeply buried targets is not the only positive
attribute they possess in the WMD preemption role. Any
attack on a chemical or biological weapons facility must
take into account the possibility that such an attack might
release large amounts of agent which could then cause
significant unintended casualties. During the Allied
invasion of Italy in the Second World War, two instances of
unintentional release of mustard gas occurred. 24 In one
case German artillery struck a chemical weapons storage
depot, in the other a bomb struck a ship in the harbor
containing the chemical weapons. 25 In each instance a cloud
of mustard gas was released and both civilian and military
casualties occurred. 26 While the evidence is not
conclusive, it has also been argued that a factor in the
"Gulf War Syndrome" is that destruction of Iraqi chemical
munitions unintentionally exposed troops to harmful amounts
24 While chemical weapons were not used by either the Allies or the
Germans during the Second World War, both sides maintained significant
stockpiles of chemical weapons near the front to provide a retaliation
in kind capability.
25 Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint




of chemical agents. 27 Given the concern regarding
collateral damage, conventional attacks on CBW targets
accessible to conventional munitions may not be practical.
A nuclear attack is probably not subject to this specific
concern. The intense heat generated by a nuclear explosion,
tens of millions of degrees 28 , will incinerate the chemical
or biological agents present at the target. While fallout
considerations are of concern, timing an attack to take
advantage of favorable winds can reduce the dangers
significantly. 29 The u dial-a-yield" 30 capability of many
nuclear weapons in the American stockpile could allow
planners to tailor the yield to neutralize both the target
and any agent present
.
Nuclear weapons appear to provide many attractive
capabilities for the counterproliferation program. Evidence
suggests that threats of nuclear retaliation can deter the
27 Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans ' Illnesses :
Final Report [document on-line] (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, December 1996, accessed on 14 September 1998);
available from http://www.gwvi.gov/ch2.html; Internet.
28 Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds
.
, The Effects of Nuclear
Weapons, United States Department Defense & United States Department of
Energy 1977, 6-7.
29 Author's conversation with Dr. Ted Harvey, Division of Atmospheric
Sciences, Lawrence-Livermore National Laboratory, 28 July 1998.
30 Many nuclear weapons in the United States stockpile are variable in
yield. By varying the amount of tritium that is injected into the core
of the primary, the amount of neutron boost, and thus the yield can be
controlled.
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use of CBW. Operationally, nuclear weapons solve difficult
targeting problems for deeply buried and CBW targets . The
lack of a nuclear-armed opponent makes the consideration of
such use more feasible than at any time in the past. These
operational considerations suggest that the United States
"should" incorporate nuclear weapons into its
counterproliferation response.
20
III. POLITICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST A NUCLEAR OPTION
On a purely operational level, the use of nuclear
weapons in a counterproliferation role appears to offer
benefits. The United States, however, is not exercising
this nuclear option. Chapters III and IV explore the
reasons why the United States has failed to pursue the
advantages that could hypothetically be derived from the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons in its
counterproliferation strategy.
A. THE NUCLEAR TABOO
Of all the potential reasons why nuclear weapons
employment options are not integrated into the U.S.
counterproliferation strategy, perhaps the most significant
is the nuclear taboo. The nuclear taboo is the label
applied to the theory that the odium attached to the use of
nuclear weapons is a significant factor in explaining their
non-use in operational contingencies since Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. According to theorists, the operational
employment of nuclear weapons is seen throughout the world
as a serious violation of international norms. Policy
makers are therefore presumed to be reluctant even to think
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about using such an "unthinkable" weapon in actual
operations against an enemy.
Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald make a persuasive
argument that a reluctance to use nuclear weapons, even when
doing so would be militarily effective with little or no
threat of retaliation in kind, has become a foundation of
American strategic culture. 31 Price and Tannenwald present
evidence that suggests that the nuclear taboo, which began
to be formed in the United States following the Second World
War, has become a global norm. 32 This acceptance of the
nuclear taboo — that any operational use of nuclear weapons
31 Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear
and Chemical Weapons Taboo," in The Culture of National Security: Norms
and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996). See also T. V. Paul, "Nuclear Taboo
and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts," The Journal of Conflict
Resolution 39, no. 4 (December 1995) for an in depth explanation of the
theory of the nuclear taboo. See George W. Ball, "The Cosmic Bluff,"
The New York Review of Books, 21 July 1983 for the implications of the
nuclear taboo on deterrence.
32 Proving that any norm exists is a difficult enterprise because by
definition norms exist only in the minds of those who hold them. Price
and Tannenwald concentrate on statements by various officials that seem
to indicate that they believe that nuclear weapons are different from
conventional weapons, and not as "usable." Other authors have
identified this phenomenon as early as 1960. Thomas Schelling
concluded, "Even those who consider a nuclear fireball as moral as
napalm for burning a man to death must recognize as a political fact a
worldwide revulsion against nuclear weapons." Thomas C. Schelling, The
Strategy of Conflict, 1 st ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1960),
257. Especially indicative that a nuclear taboo existed as early as the
1950s are discussion within the National Security Council in which
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles expressed a desire to
"change public attitudes about the atomic bomb and reduce the widespread
squeamishness about its use." Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink:
Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," International Security
12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), 107.
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is seen as unacceptable behavior — has significant
implications for U.S. counterproliferation policy. 33 If the
United States ever used nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive
attack, or even in retaliation to a CBW attack, the
resulting domestic and international political outrage would
likely outweigh any military gains. This taboo may have
become so ingrained as an international norm that explicit
threats to use nuclear weapons to respond to CBW in a crisis
where such employment seemed plausible might well be seen as
illegitimate (and possibly illegal) by the world community.
Actual operational employment of nuclear weapons would
likely provoke widespread condemnation from other nations
.
The nuclear taboo provides some explanation as to why
the United States would limit the role nuclear weapons play
in its counterproliferation policy. The United States may
also be limiting its nuclear options to strengthen the
nuclear taboo. The existence of the nuclear taboo has
several positive benefits. If the nuclear taboo really is
accepted internationally, then it tends to reduce the
chances that the United States would face a nuclear attack.
Of course, the taboo does not guarantee that such an attack
33 The international legal implications of the nuclear taboo, especially
the evidence of its existence in the July 1996 advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice are discussed in the next chapter.
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will never happen. 34 Any reduction in the probability of a
nuclear attack, however, can only be a positive development
for individuals living in states that value human rights and
the status quo. The nuclear taboo also has the positive and
more tangible benefit of reducing nuclear proliferation.
Many nations that have the technological capability to
produce nuclear weapons have not developed nuclear arsenals.
While there are many reasons why some nations have decided
that nuclear weapons are not worth pursuing, the nuclear
taboo may be one reason why some nations have decided not to
build nuclear weapons. 35 Thus, maintaining the nuclear
taboo promotes the U.S. nonproliferation agenda. Any
actions which tend to weaken the nuclear taboo, such as
explicitly and openly thinking about the operational use of
nuclear weapons, may not be in the interest of the United
States
.
34 Perhaps the greatest nuclear threat the United States faces with the
end of the Cold War comes from a "rogue" nation or terrorist
organization acquiring some form of nuclear weapons. Such actors' lack
of conformity to international norms makes their use of nuclear weapons
seem much more likely.
35 See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their
Nuclear Capabilities (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
1995); Jim Walsh, "Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of
Australia's Nuclear Ambitions," Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 1 (Fall
1997); and Paul M. Cole, Atomic Bombast: Nuclear Decisionmaking in
Sweden 1945 - 1972, Occasional Paper No. 26 (Washington, D.C.: The Henry
L. Stimson Center, April 1996) for discussion of the reasons why states
limit their nuclear capability.
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B. THE NONPROLIFERATION ARGUMENT
Explicit reliance on nuclear weapons as retaliatory-
weapons to respond to CBW may tend to weaken the nuclear
taboo, and thus indirectly affect the U.S. nonproliferation
agenda. A specific, unambiguously worded reliance on
nuclear weapons to respond to CBW also may conflict with the
primary nonproliferation tool used by the United States, the
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
.
One of the central goals in U.S nonproliferation
strategy was the indefinite extension of the NPT. As part
of its nonproliferation strategy, the United States has
offered negative security assurances to persuade states to
support the NPT. To help gain the support of the non-
nuclear weapons states for the NPT's indefinite extension,
the United States reaffirmed its negative security
assurances to the non-nuclear weapons states party to the
NPT. In articulating these negative security assurances,
President Clinton declared the policy of the United States
as follows:
The United States reaffirms that it will not use
nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon
states parties to the Treaty on the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the
case of an invasion or any other attack on the
United States, its territories, its armed forces
or other troops, its allies, or on a state towards
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which it has a security commitment, carried out or
sustained by such a non-nuclear weapon State in
association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon
State. 36
This reaffirmation of a policy first stated under President
Carter in 1978 was helpful in shoring up support for the NPT
extension. 37 Although this pledge is not part of the NPT,
it is generally accepted as being the quid pro quo which was
offered by the United States and the other four nuclear
powers to convince enough states to vote to extend
indefinitely the NPT. 38 The pledge also made it clear to
the world that the United States would not use nuclear
weapons against a non-nuclear signatory to the NPT unless
that state attacked the United States, its territories, its
36U.S. Department of State, "Statement by the Honorable Warren
Christopher, Secretary of State, Regarding a Declaration by the
President on Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Weapons States-Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 5 April
1995, quoted in Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy [document on-line]
(British American Security Information Council, March 1998, accessed 18
March 1998); available from: http://www.basicint.org/nfuture2.pdf;
Internet
.
37 David Gompert, Kenneth Watmann and Dean Wilkening, U.S. Nuclear
Declaratory Policy: The Question of Nuclear First Use, (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 1995), 4.
38 Each of the five nuclear powers submitted statements to the United
Nations Security Council (S/1995/261, S/1995/262, S/1995/263,
S/1995/264, and S/1995/265) . The Security Council responded with a
resolution, S/RES/984 ( 1995) , which recognized these pledges and also the
fact that non-nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT have a
"legitimate interest...to receive assurances that the Security Council,
and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members will act
immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations." United Nations Security Council Resolution 984
(1995), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3514 th meeting on 11 April
1995.
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armed forces, its allies, or a state towards which it has a
security commitment, and did so in alliance with another
nuclear weapons state. Were the United States ever to use
nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state or even
to make its policy to do so unambiguous and explicit, some
states might well decide to renounce their pledge to refrain
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Article X of the NPT allows
states to withdraw unilaterally from the NPT with three
months notice. It is conceivable that some states would
view an unambiguous U.S. policy of nuclear retaliation in
response to CBW attacks as a violation of the conditions
under which some states agreed to extend indefinitely the
NPT. 39 Some states might even decide that some form of WM£>
is required to serve as a deterrent against the United
States. Even if the fear of nuclear attack from the United
States did not drive states to acquire nuclear weapons or
other WMD, a policy that unambiguously renounced negative
security assurances might cause other states to conclude
that United States is not serious about nonproliferation.
39 In oral arguments before the International Court of Justice, Mexico
threatened to withdraw from the NPT if the nuclear powers do not fulfill
their commitments to disarm as called for in Art VI of the NPT. It is
likely that increased reliance on nuclear weapons will make such
sentiment stronger.
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This perception could negatively affect the nonproliferation
regime
.
Successful use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons
to achieve U.S. goals could convince other nations that they
too should acquire nuclear weapons to achieve their policy
goals, or to prevent the United States from being a "nuclear
bully." There is evidence that suggests that the Chinese
decision to develop nuclear weapons was influenced by
American nuclear coercion during the Korean War and Quemoy-
Matsu crisis. According to Mao Tse-Tung, "If we are not to
be bullied in the present-day world, we can not do without
the Bomb." 40 The Chinese decision to build an atomic bomb
come in January 1955, in the midst of the Quemoy-Matsu
crisis. 41 While other factors such as China's increasingly
antagonistic relationship with the Soviet Union in the late
1950' s and early 1960's undoubtedly influenced the Chinese
decision to build a nuclear arsenal as well, the role of
U.S. nuclear diplomacy almost certainly played some part.
40 Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 5, "On the Ten Major
Relationships," Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 25 April 1956,
[document on-line] available from http://www.blythe.org/mlm/mao/vol5/
mswv5_51.htm; Internet; accessed 3 November 1998.
41 John W. Lewis and Li-tai Xue, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1988), 1.
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The potential for damage to the nonproliferation agenda
suggests that the United States should rely as little as
possible on nuclear weapons to respond to chemical and
biological threats
.
A U.S. failure to maintain a nuclear response option to
CBW, however, also could lead to increased nuclear
proliferation. Currently the United States provides
positive security assurances and nuclear protection
commitments to a host of non-nuclear weapons states. These
assurances provide an incentive for non-nuclear allies such
as Germany to remain non-nuclear. 42 These states are
protected from nuclear attack by the nuclear umbrella of the
United States. The increasing threat of chemical and
biological weapons may cause some of the states covered by
United States nuclear guarantees to request these guarantees
be extended to cover chemical and biological threats as
well. Germany apparently already considers the U.S. nuclear
umbrella as defending Germany against all forms of WMD.
According to a statement in 1992 by Volker Riihe, then
Germany's Defense Minister, "These weapons insure us
politically against risks that we cannot calculate, risks
42 David S. Yost, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Prospects and
Priorities , Future Roles Series Paper no. 7 (Sandia National
Laboratories, December 1996), 18.
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which might arise from the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction." 43 If the United States is not prepared to
defend its allies against CBW as well as nuclear threats,
these states will have an incentive to develop their own
nuclear forces.
The nuclear taboo and the U.S. nonproliferation agenda
offer convincing explanations why nuclear weapons do not
play a more significant role in U.S. counterproliferation
policy. While there might be some operational benefits in
their use in some contingencies, there would also be serious
political costs associated with even just announcing the
decision to use nuclear weapons to retaliate to a CBW
attack.
By contrast, there also might be political costs
associated with America's failure to use nuclear weapons to
respond to a CBW attack, especially if U.S. troops or
territory were targeted. Policy makers might face an
outraged American public if the perpetrator of such an
attack were not punished sufficiently. The American
public's response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is
telling. This one event quickly changed public sentiment
43 Volker Rune cited in Michael Evans, "NATO Says Farewell to Nuclear
Conflict," The Times (London), 21 October 1992, quoted in Ibid.
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from an isolationist view to one fully supporting total war.
The total mobilization of virtually every aspect of American
society is exemplary of the potential of a democracy
enraged. Political arguments against a nuclear response to
CBW could easily evaporate.
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IV. LEGAL AND MORAL EXPLANATIONS
The nuclear taboo may partially explain the non-use of
nuclear weapons. It may also help to explain the absence of
an unambiguous nuclear retaliatory threat in the U.S.
counterproliferation program. Another explanation, however,
may help to account for the lack of a strong nuclear
component to the U.S. counterproliferation strategy: the
legal and moral judgement that the rest of the world,
including the U.S. public, makes regarding nuclear weapons.
Although it can be suggested that the nuclear taboo is a
judgement about the morality of using nuclear weapons, the
nuclear taboo refers to a decision-maker's own values and
beliefs. The nuclear taboo is only effective in preventing
the use of nuclear weapons if decision-makers believe in it.
The legal and moral beliefs others hold regarding the use of
nuclear weapons can,- however, limit a decision makers'
actions if they wish to refrain from incurring the
condemnation of those who believe that the use of nuclear
weapons would be either illegal or immoral.
Like most issues in international politics, judgements
about the legality or morality of using nuclear weapons are
not unanimous. However, with the exception of the NPT-
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recognized nuclear powers (minus China, which did not submit
either written or oral arguments) and some of their allies,
the majority of states that submitted either written or oral
arguments to the International Court of Justice (ICJ, or the
Court) regarding the case Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, stated that the use of nuclear weapons
would be either illegal, immoral, or both. 44
Short of an international treaty outlawing the use of
nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that the nuclear and non-
nuclear states will ever reach consensus regarding the
legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons. It is
possible, however, to identify how governments,
international organizations, and international jurists
regard the legality and morality of nuclear weapons. One
44 In oral and written arguments, the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and France argued that the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons was not illegal. These four states plus Germany and Italy (in
spite of a parliamentary resolution to the contrary) also argued that
the Court should use its discretion and not rule on the case. Japan, a
U.S. ally, presented a mixed argument to the Court in which it did not
argue either for or against illegality, but allowed the mayors of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki to argue for illegality. The remainder of the 22
countries submitting oral statements argued that the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons was illegal under all circumstances. Two of the
states making this argument were U.S. allies — Australia and New
Zealand. 43 countries submitted written statements to the Court. Of
these, 28 argued in favor of illegality. Data compiled from "Notes on
Hearing at World Court" [document on-line] available from
http://www.propl.org/propl/; Internet; accessed 11 November 1998.
hearnote.htm and "Verbatim Excerpts of Oral Statements to the
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons" [document on-line] available from
http://www.peacenet.org/disarm/icjquote.html; Internet; accessed 11
November 1998.
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method of gaining insight into the thinking of these actors
is by examining the International Court of Justice case
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons . While the
case was decided on legal grounds, these legal grounds and
many of the arguments presented to the Court are drawn from
classic traditions of Western moral thought. This case thus
provides insight into both moral and legal opinions of
several of international actors regarding use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons.'
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE OPINION
In a 1996 decision, the International Court of Justice
issued an advisory opinion that seemed to declare the use of
nuclear weapons illegal in all but the most extreme
circumstances. 45 In a decision split seven votes to seven
votes, the Court decided that the use of nuclear weapons
would be illegal in most circumstances, but that it is
possible that scenarios exist in which such use would be
legal . Although this advisory opinion does not have the
binding authority of international law, it shows the legal
thinking of some of the most distinguished international
jurists on the subject. The ICJ issued its advisory opinion
45 Thaliff Dean, "Use of Nuclear Weapons Illegal, Say World Court,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 July 199 6, 4.
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in response to requests from the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the United Nations General Assembly. The General
Assembly posed the question: "Is the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under
international law?" 46 The WHO requested an opinion on the
question: "In view of the health and environmental effects,
would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or armed
conflict be a breach of its obligations under international
law including the WHO constitution?" 47 Although the ICJ
eventually ruled that the WHO had overstepped its authority
in requesting an advisory opinion, the Court accepted
written and oral arguments for both cases simultaneously.
The Court issued its opinion on the General Assembly
question on 8 July 1996 . The opinion issued by the Court
consisted of the six findings:
A. Unanimously,
There is in neither customary nor conventional
international law any specific authorization of
the threat or use of nuclear weapons;
46 General Assembly Resolution 49/75K (15 December 1994), quoted in
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List no. 95
(Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, 8 July 1996
[Hereafter UNGA Opinion] ) [document on-line] , available from
http://www.ddh.nl/org/inlana/avise.html; Internet; accessed 21 June
1998.
47 World Health Organization Resolution 46/40 (14 May 1993) quoted in
UNGA Opinion, para. 1
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B. By eleven votes to three,
There is in neither customary nor conventional
international law any comprehensive and universal
prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons as such;
C. Unanimously,
A threat or use of force by means of nuclear
weapons that is contrary to Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and
that fails to meet all the requirements of
Article 51, is unlawful
;
D. Unanimously,
A threat .or use of nuclear weapons should also be
compatible with the requirements of the
international law applicable in armed conflict,
particularly those of the principles and rules of
international humanitarian law, as well as with
specific obligations under treaties and other
undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear
weapons
;
E. By seven votes to seven, by the President's
casting vote,
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict,
and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of
international law, and of the elements of fact at
its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very




There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under
strict and effective international control. 48
Two important points are apparent from this decision. The
first is that while international law does not specifically
authorize the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons,
neither does it prohibit it. The second point is that
lacking specific law prohibiting or allowing the use or
threatened use of nuclear weapons, any use or threatened use
of nuclear weapons is lawful provided it meets the
requirements of the United Nations Charter governing the use
of force and other international law applicable to armed
conflict. Thus, nuclear weapons may be legally used
provided they meet the requirements of necessity,
proportionality and discrimination (jus in bello), 49 and
that such use or threatened use is done in self-defense or
in support of a United Nations Security Council Resolution
authorizing the use of force (jus ad bellum) .
48 UNGA Opinion, para. 105(2)
49 Necessity refers to the requirement that the attack be against a
target of military value. Proportionality, or preventing "unnecessary
suffering" as the opinion phrases it, requires that the attack be
proportionate to what is required to destroy or neutralize the target.
Discrimination ("distinction" in UNGA Opinion) is often included in the
proportionality requirement. It requires that the attacker discriminate
between military and non-military targets.
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While the Court was unanimous in its opinion that the
rules of armed conflict established prior to the creation of
WMD also applied to nuclear weapons, it was divided as to
whether or not nuclear weapons could actually meet the
requirements of necessity, proportionality, and
discrimination. For this reason, the Court issued the fifth
part of its ruling in language which neither those
supporting legality or illegality find satisfactory. 50 This
lack of clarity is perhaps the most perplexing aspect of the
opinion. 51
In presenting their written and oral arguments to the
Court, several nuclear powers suggested that in certain
cases, it would be possible for nuclear weapons to be used
in ways that would meet the jus in hello requirements. The
Court rejected this argument as conclusory because it did
not cite specific scenarios that would meet the jus In hello
requirements. So while the Court itself does not "write
50 Michael N. Schmitt, "The International Court of Justice and the Use
of Nuclear Weapons," Naval War College Review Spring 1998 [journal on-
line] available from http://www.usnwc.edu/nwc/art6-sp8.htm; Internet;
accessed 14 May 1998.
1
,According to Schmitt, the Court is guilty of issuing a non liquet, or
non decision, on the key issue in the case. Schmitt, 11. Given
disagreement within the Court, as well as the divergence in
international opinions, this is understandable. It reflects an
uneasiness regarding nuclear weapons but also an understanding that
nuclear weapons are not going to disappear overnight and that the value
of the deterrence and war prevention function they apparently provide
can not be dismissed lightly.
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scenarios" 52 to determine cases in which a particular use of
nuclear weapons would be either legal or illegal, it seems
to suggest that scenarios exist in which nuclear weapons
could be used while still meeting the jus in hello
requirements
:
Thus, methods and means of warfare, which would
preclude any distinction between civilian and
military targets, or which would result in
unnecessary suffering to combatants, are
prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics
of nuclear weapons, to which the Court has
referred above, the use of such weapons in fact
seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such
requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considers
that it does not have sufficient elements to
enable it to conclude with certainty that the use
of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at
variance with the principles and rules of law
applicable in armed conflict in any
circums tance . 53
If such scenarios exist, then the use of nuclear weapons
would be consistent with international law in some
circumstances
.
52 The Court stated: "Certain States have however expressed the fear
that the abstract nature of the question might lead the Court to make
hypothetical or speculative declarations outside the scope of its
judicial function. The Court does not consider that, in giving an
advisory opinion in the present case, it would necessarily have to write
'scenarios', to study various types of nuclear weapons and to evaluate
highly complex and controversial technological, strategic and scientific
information. The Court will simply address the issues arising in all
their aspects by applying the legal rules relevant to the situation."
UNGA Opinion, para. 15.
53 UNGA Opinion, para. 15, italics added.
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While not ruling directly on the legality of the
deterrent role for nuclear weapons, the Court noted in
passing the fact that nuclear weapons have served in a
deterrent role for "many years." 54 Because the Court
accepted the deterrent role of nuclear weapons without
commenting on the legality or illegality of deterrence, it
would appear that the Court accepts the deterrent value of
nuclear weapons as legitimate. If a legitimate use of
nuclear weapons is to deter conventional as well as nuclear
war, then it is logical to conclude that a legitimate use of
nuclear weapons would be to prevent the use of other weapons
of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons.
As an advisory opinion, the ICJ decision does not carry
the force of law and is not binding on any state. No
nuclear-weapons state has decided to unilaterally disarm in
light of the decision. The United States considers nuclear
weapons vital to its defense. This will likely remain the
case indefinitely. The U.S. oral argument before the Court
makes policy of the United States to retain nuclear weapons
clear
.
54 Ibid., para 96. It is significant that the Court did not
differentiate between nuclear weapons' ability to deter both
conventional and nuclear war.
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The argument that international law prohibits, in
all cases, the use of nuclear weapons appears to
be premised on the incorrect assumption that every
use of every type of nuclear weapon will
necessarily share certain characteristics which
contravene the law of armed conflict.
Specifically, it appears to be assumed that any
use of nuclear weapons will inevitably escalate
into a massive strategic nuclear exchange,
resulting automatically in the deliberate
destruction of the population centers of opposing
sides. This assumption is entirely unwarranted;
it is based on myth, not fact. As explained in
many of my country's statements on the subject
over the past three decades, US deterrence
strategy is designed to provide a range of options
in response to armed aggression that will control
escalation and terminate armed conflict as soon as
possible.... Mr. President, Members of the Court: we
too have lived with the spectre of nuclear war for
generations. Ours is in every sense a defensive
strategy; and very frankly we believe the policy
of nuclear deterrence has saved many millions of
lives from the scourge of war during the past
fifty years. In this special sense, nuclear
weapons have been "used, " defensively, every day
for over a half a century - to preserve the
peace . 55
The decision of the ICJ is unlikely to have much effect in
shaping U.S. nuclear policy. The case is important because
it demonstrates that the United States and the other nuclear
powers are in the minority in their views on nuclear
weapons. In a legal and moral sense, situations likely
exist in which nuclear weapons could be used, while still
55 "Verbatim Excerpts of Oral Statements to the International Court of
Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons."
Available from http-.// www.peacenet.org/disarm/icjquote.html; Internet;
accessed 17 November 1998.
42
meeting the requirements of proportionality, necessity, and
discrimination. The majority of states in the world,
however, do not accept this view. Even if U.S. decision-
makers do not believe in the nuclear taboo, the potential
condemnation from the rest of the world serves as a check on
what they can openly declare as U.S. nuclear policy.
43
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V. CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES POLICY OF CALCULATED
AMBIGUITY
The negative security assurances offered to non-nuclear
weapons states party to the NPT constitute an important
element of U.S. declaratory policy regarding the use of
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. Since
the reaffirmation of this policy in April 1995, no
announcements have been made to change this declaratory
policy. In fact, Clinton administration officials have
stated that negative security assurances remain in effect
and that the policy remains unchanged. 56 Presidential
Decision Directives, statements by administration officials,
and wording within joint doctrine publications however,
indicate that either this policy is not as clear cut as it
appears and is thus calculated to be ambiguous, or that
there is an inconsistency between the intentions of the
United States and the way it conducts nuclear planning.
56
"Responses of Secretary Perry to Questions Asked by Chairman Helms,"
in Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Convention on
Chemical Weapons: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations.
104 th Cong., 2 nd sess., 13, 21, and 28 March 1996, 169-170.
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A. CONDITIONS ON NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES?
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on 28 March 1996, in support of ratification of
the Convention on Chemical Weapons, then Secretary of
Defense William Perry stated:
For obvious reasons we choose not to specify in
detail what responses we would make to a chemical
attack. However, as we stated in the Gulf War, if
any country were foolish enough to use chemical
weapons against the United States, our response
would be absolutely overwhelming and
devastating. 57
In the same hearing, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General John Shalikashvili, stated:
While U.S. forces will forego CW retaliation in
kind we will retain a retaliatory capability
second to none. Should deterrence fail, a
chemical attack against U.S. forces would be
regarded as an extremely grave action subject to
an appropriate non-chemical response of our
choosing. The U.S. will rely on the full range of
military capabilities to deter CW use, and if need
be to retaliate, including the application of
superior military force complemented by our robust
CW defense program. 58
57
"Statement of Hon. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense," in
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Convention on Chemical
Weapons: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations . 104 th
Cong., 2 nd sess., 13, 21, and 28 March 1996, 121.
58
"Prepared Statement of General Shalikashvili," in Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations. Convention on Chemical Weapons: Hearing
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 104 th Cong., 2 nd sess., 13,
21, and 28 March 1996, 131.
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The implication taken from these two statements is that in
responding to CBW, the United States retains the options to
use any weapon in the U.S. arsenal, including nuclear
weapons. When asked by Senator Claiborne Pell to clarify
this policy, Secretary Perry responded ambiguously, but
confirmed that the use of nuclear weapons would be
considered to retaliate against a CBW attack:
Senator PELL: If, God forbid, another country did
stage a chemical weapon attack, what would be the
response: Would it be — are you thinking in terms
of conventional weapons? What would be the means
of responding?
Secretary PERRY: We would not specify in advance
what our response to a chemical attack is except
to say it would be devastating. And we have a
wide range of military capabilities to make good
on that threat
.
Senator PELL: I guess basically two, conventional
and nuclear. There is not much else.
Secretary PERRY: The whole range would be
considered. That is correct. 59
This testimony suggests that nuclear retaliation would be
considered in response to a chemical (and presumably a
biological) attack. However, the testimony did not state
59 Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Convention on
Chemical Weapons: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations.
104 th Cong., 2 nd sess . , 13, 21, and 28 March 1996, 134-135.
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explicitly that nuclear weapons would be used, probably
because the specific circumstances of future contingencies
cannot be known in advance. Thus potential CBW attackers,
as well as non-nuclear signatories to the NPT, are left to
estimate what the actual U.S. policy might be in a specific
contingency. This approach is apparently calculated to gain
some deterrent value from the U.S. nuclear arsenal while
still maintaining a policy of avoiding nuclear attacks on
non-nuclear weapons states, as stated in the NPT-related
negative security assurances. This statement of U.S.
nuclear weapons employment policy was neither the first nor
the last example of what has come to be known as the policy
of "calculated" or "strategic" ambiguity.
In December 1997, the Washington Post reported that
President Clinton had issued new guidance, the first since
1981, regarding nuclear planning. 60 This Presidential
Decision Directive, PDD 60 reportedly reflects the same type
of thinking apparent in Secretary Perry and Chairman
Shalikashvili ' s testimony. While the text of this document
has not been released, it was reported to focus mainly on
nuclear planning issues related to Russia and China. 61 More
60 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear
Arms: Centering on Deterrence, Officials Drop Terms for Long Atomic War'
The Washington Post, 7 December 1997, sec. A, p. 1.
61 Ibid.
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importantly for this discussion, the directive reportedly
considers the use of nuclear weapons in response to threats
of CBW. Robert Bell, the National Security Council official
who provided the Clinton administration's comments on this
PDD, stated that the directive "reflects 'much greater
sensitivity to the threat' posed by chemical and biological
attacks." 62 He stated that this was not a change in policy,
but that it
reiterates what senior administration officials
already have said about the issue during the past
year — namely, that if any nation uses weapons of
mass destruction against the United States, it may
"forfeit" its protection from U.S. nuclear attack
under the 199 5 pledge. 63
PDD 60 and the testimony cited earlier imply that while the
negative security assurances reaffirmed in 1995 have not
been withdrawn, the administration has attached conditions
to these negative security assurances that were not stated
in the original NPT-associated declaration. While these
conditions may seem obvious, they have not been officially
appended to the negative security guarantee that PDD 60




B. JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND WMD
Other indications that U.S. negative security
assurances are not absolute are evident in documents
regarding joint nuclear planning. Recently the British
American Security Information Council (BASIC) , a group which
advocates the complete abolition of nuclear weapons,
published a paper taking the United States military to task
for its Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint
Publication 3-12. 64 The BASIC paper, relying on
declassified documents released under the Freedom of
Information Act and unclassified joint publications, makes
the argument that military planners in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
have interpreted American counterproliferation policy as a
mandate to rely on nuclear weapons to counter WMD. BASIC
claims that this has resulted in a dangerous situation in
which the declaratory policy suggested by the negative
security assurances of no use of nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapons states clashes with a military doctrine
that condones such use for purposes of deterrence. 65
64 Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear Futures : Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy [document on-line] (British American
Security Information Council, March 1998); available from:
http://www.basicint.org/nfuture2.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 March 1998.
55 Ibid. , 21-22.
50
While this organization's bias in favor of the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons has likely colored the
conclusions of this paper, the paper does bring up some
interesting questions. According to Joint Publication3-12
:
the fundamental use of US nuclear forces is to
deter the use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)
,
particularly nuclear weapons, and to serve
as a hedge against the emergence of an
overwhelming conventional threat . 66
This passage suggests that United States may threaten to
employ nuclear weapons against WMD proliferators for
purposes of deterrence, especially when one considers the
way WMD is defined:
weapons that are capable of a high order of
destruction and/ or being used in such a manner as
to destroy large numbers of people. Can be
nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological
weapons 67
While an organization with an abolitionist agenda such
as BASIC might view this as a proposal to use nuclear
weapons to deter a chemical and biological attack against
the United States, closer study of the document reveals that
this is not what the Joint Publication espouses. While the
66 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12,
"Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1995), v.
67 Ibid. , GL-2.
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publication does discuss the use of nuclear weapons to deter
other forms of WMD, it is primarily concerned with nuclear
deterrence of nuclear attacks . The phrase "particularly
nuclear weapons" in the Joint Publication 3-12 's definition
of the "fundamental use of nuclear weapons" for deterrence
is significant. While use of U.S. nuclear weapons to deter
other forms of WMD, or even an "overwhelming conventional
threat" is not ruled out, these uses of U.S. nuclear weapons
are not the primary focus of the publication. In fact, the
publication goes on to describe the negative political
effects of any operational employment of nuclear weapons. 68
Clearly, joint doctrine does not view nuclear weapons as the
ultimate answer to WMD proliferation. Rather, it takes the
view that in certain circumstances nuclear weapons might
serve as a useful tool of national policy. At no time,
however, will the decision to use nuclear weapons rest
anywhere but with the U.S. President. 69 Therefore there is
not a disconnect between U.S. policy and military doctrine.
Rather, joint doctrine reflects the U.S. policy of neither
ruling in, nor ruling out, the use of any weapon (other than
CBW) to respond to the threat of CBW.
68
"The nation that initiates the use of nuclear weapons may find itself
the target of world condemnation." Joint Publication 3-12, II-l.
69 Ibid.
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C. A CALCULATED AMBIGUITY?
A USSTRATCOM study on deterrence recently released
under the Freedom of Information Act concludes that in
carrying out deterrence, some uncertainty in the mind of the
deterrence target is useful:
While it is crucial to explicitly define and
communicate, the acts or damage that we would find
unacceptable, we should not be too specific about
our responses . Because of the value that comes
from the ambiguity of what the U.S. may do to an
adversary if the acts we seek to deter are carried
out, it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully
rational or cool-headed. The fact that some
elements may appear to be potentially "out of
control" can be beneficial to creating and
reinforcing fears and doubts within the minds of
an adversary's decision makers. This essential
sense of fear is the working force of deterrence.
That the US may become irrational and vindictive
if its vital interests are attacked should be a




The conclusion that threats that are too specific have less
deterrent value, expressed above, is evident in PDD 60
(according to reports of its content) , as well as in the
testimony of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs. These U.S. policy statements make it
clear that the United State has not ruled out any options
70 United States Strategic Command, "Essentials of Post Cold War
Deterrence", 1995. Partially declassified and released under the
Freedom of Information Act. Conclusions quoted in Kristensen, 33-34
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for response to a CBW attack. It is not clear what action
the United States would take in response to a CBW attack;
however, it is clear that the response might include nuclear
weapons. Military doctrine statements found in Joint
Publications 3-12 and 3-12.1 also make it clear that
military planners have thought about these contingencies and
have taken the appropriate action to prepare for them. This
unwillingness to rule out the use of nuclear weapons, while
at the same time stating that negative security assurances
are still valid, provides some of the uncertainty and
irrationality called for in the "Essentials of Post Cold War
Deterrence .
"
Ambiguity regarding U.S. responses to CBW attacks is
not a new phenomenon. In fact, it is a continuation of the
same policy of ambiguity carried out by the Bush
administration during the Gulf War. The United States was
concerned that Iraq might use its CBW in opposition to the
coalition. To deter Saddam Hussein from taking this action,
the United States sent a strong warning to Iraq regarding
this issue. The warning, delivered by Secretary of State
Baker in the form of a letter from President Bush, stated
that any use of WMD would result in the "strongest possible
response" and cause Iraq and its leader to "pay a terrible
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price." 71 It was not specifically stated how the United
States would cause Iraq to pay this price. In fact, the
ambiguity was intentional. Baker described this policy as
"calculated ambiguity" because, according to Baker, although
Iraq was made to believe that the United States might use
nuclear weapons, President Bush had already decided that
they would not be used under any circumstances and that a
conventional response to CBW attacks would be sufficient. 72
The apparent effectiveness of nuclear weapons in
deterring Iraq was noted by the U.S. military. William
Arkin, an opponent of nuclear weapons, assigns the apparent
success of this policy as the reason why nuclear weapons
were given the expanded role of deterring the use of all
types of WMD in Joint Publication3-12
.
73 While this
judgement might be correct, it seems more likely that the
apparent success of the ambiguous threat has led to a
continuation of the policy of calculated ambiguity. In a
written response to questions from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee as to why Iraq did not use its chemical
71 William M. Arkin, "Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the
Gulf War", The Washington Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Autumn 1996), 12.
72 James A. Baker III and Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 359.
73 Arkin. , 4
.
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weapons against coalition forces, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, stated:
the Iraqis may not have been sure what types of
force would have been used in retaliation to their
use of chemical weapons. Only Saddam Hussein can
tell why he chose not to use chemical weapons
.
However, it is generally believed that the biggest
reason was the fear of massive retaliation by
coalition forces. 74
It appears then, that the policy of calculated ambiguity has
become part of the American strategic culture. Several
arguments exist to support this theory. First, a policy of
threatening massive and overwhelming retaliation, implicitly
not excluding nuclear retaliation, coupled with a refusal to
disavow negative security assurances forswearing such
retaliation, has been adopted by two successive
administrations, both Democratic and Republican. If such a
policy is acceptable to both administrations, it could well
remain so for future administrations
.
Second, calculated ambiguity appeals to a spectrum of
players in the counterproliferation and nonproliferation
arena. To the military, especially the "nuclear warriors"
at USSTRATCOM, it offers another justification for the
74
"Responses of Chairman Shalikashvili to Questions Asked by Chairman
Helms," in Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Convention
on Chemical Weapons: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations.
104 th Cong., 2 nd sess., 13, 21, and 28 March 1996, 166.
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continued maintenance of America's nuclear arsenal. The end
of the Cold War and the diminished threat of nuclear war
helped to advance the argument that nuclear weapons should
be eliminated. Such a position, promoted even by a few
retired military officers such as Generals Butler and
Goodpaster, is anathema to USSTRATCOM's raison d'etre. 15
Calculated ambiguity, and its requirement for a nuclear
deterrent, is a new reason to maintain nuclear weapons.
Third, the policy of calculated ambiguity is attractive
to civilians within the government because it allows them to
maintain a deterrent vis-a-vis rogue states that might
threaten the United States or America's allies or interests.
Destroying Iraq's WMD, for example, was one of the reasons
why the American public supported the U.S. decision to
participate in Operation Desert Storm. 76 Calculated
ambiguity allows policy makers to point to the fact that no
retaliatory option for CBW attacks has been ruled out, and
that they take the threat of CBW seriously.
75 See Lee Butler, "The Case for Eliminating Nuclear Weapons" [document
on-line] available from http://www.peacenet.org/disarm/leebdt.html;
Internet; accessed 17 November 1998 and "Statement on Nuclear Weapons by
International Generals and Admirals" [document on-line] available from
http://www. peacenet.org/disarm/abolish.html; Internet; accessed 17
November 1998; for opinions of Generals Butler and Goodpaster, and a
number of foreign flag and general officers.
76 Arkin, 3.
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Fourth, the policy of calculated ambiguity is
attractive to the nonproliferation community because it
allows the United States to maintain negative security
assurances as a part of its nonproliferation policy. By
avoiding explicit statements that the United States relies
on nuclear weapons to deter CBW attacks, the United States
can retain its negative security assurances. The written
answer supplied by Secretary Perry regarding this question
reflects the Clinton administration's desire to maintain the
appearance of the negative security assurances, even if this
appearance is a facade:
Question 75. If the United States is to rely upon
a combination of conventional or nuclear-weapons
responses for deterrence purposes, should the U.S.
reevaluate its policy on negative security
assurances?
Answer. There is no need to reevaluate the U.S.
negative security assurance as it does not detract
from the ability of the United States to deter CW
use by an adversary through the threat of an
overwhelming and devastating response. 77
This ability to retain the negative security assurances as
official declaratory policy is attractive to policy makers,
especially those in the arms control community. It allows
them to support international norms against the use of
77
"Responses of Secretary Perry to Questions Asked by Chairman Helms,"
170.
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nuclear weapons. Simply pointing to the official policy
that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states gives the government cover when it
is accused of "bullying" tactics.
Short of a declaration from an official in the Clinton
administration that nuclear weapons would never actually be
used, it is difficult to demonstrate that a policy of
calculated ambiguity as described by Secretary Baker is
actually in place. It is possible that the current policy
does not actually allow for nuclear retaliation against a
CBW attacker. It seems more likely, however, that the
policy actually reflects the official U.S. position neither
ruling in nor ruling out the use of nuclear weapons in
retaliation to CBW attacks. This refusal to rule in or rule
out the use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against a CBW
attack, however, does not stem entirely from a calculated
decision to keep the nuclear employment options open.
Rather, it may be the result of indecision within the
National Command Authority.
Indecision as to whether or not to rely on a nuclear
deterrent to CBW attack is understandable. The decision of
when to retaliate with nuclear weapons is perhaps the most
difficult decision any policy maker would face. The nuclear
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taboo discussed in Chapter III seems to have become part of
the American psyche. Any decision to use nuclear weapons
operationally would come into conflict with this norm. The
moral arguments against the operational use of nuclear
weapons explored in Chapter IV contribute to the anguish
that would be experienced in deciding whether to use nuclear
weapons in anger. While the reasons not to authorize the
use of nuclear weapons are compelling, so too are the
reasons why such authorization might ultimately be required.
Given their responsibility to defend the United States and
its way of life, politicians and military officers have a
responsibility to consider every option to this end. As
Chapter II demonstrated, some situations could arise in
which the use of nuclear weapons might provide the best
option for defense. These competing arguments would put the
decision-maker in a difficult dilemma.
The strategy of calculated ambiguity offers decision-
makers a way out of the dilemma created by the trade-offs
associated with any decision to employ nuclear weapons in
battle. By putting off the decision until the indefinite
future when circumstances may force them to make a choice,
policymakers can still appear to have a coherent policy, the
policy of calculated ambiguity. National decision-makers
thus avoid an agonizing decision while presenting an
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outwardly decisive facade . If never tested, calculated
ambiguity provides an expedient solution to the moral
dilemmas created by seriously contemplating when and how to
use nuclear weapons. If it is tested by an adversary armed
with CBW, however, calculated ambiguity could result in
significant damage to the national interest. If forced to
choose whether to use nuclear weapons in a crisis, a lack of
prior planning and thought could lead to an unwise snap
decision damaging to the national interest. The worst time
to confront planners and policy makers with the decision of




Many factors affect U.S. decisions about the role
nuclear weapons should play in counterproliferation
strategy. Nuclear weapons, at least in some circumstances,
provide significant deterrent capability vis-a-vis chemical
and biological threats. In some circumstances, they also
offer the most effective operational characteristics for
destroying chemical and biological weapons facilities. The
use of nuclear weapons to deter the use of CBW or to destroy
CBW facilities, however, has not been embraced as an
explicit part of U.S. counterproliferation policy. This is
not because of operational difficulties encountered in
relying on nuclear weapons to carry out these
counterproliferation missions. Instead, the nuclear taboo
explains why decision-makers are reluctant to use nuclear
weapons operationally in any but the most extreme
circumstances . The negative impact that increased reliance
on nuclear weapons would have on the nonproliferation
strategy of the United States also provides disincentives
for making public announcements about using a nuclear option
for counterproliferation. Finally, the judgements many
states have made about the legality and morality of the use
of nuclear weapons limit the degree to which the United
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States can publicly rely on these weapons as a response to
chemical and biological threats
.
These factors have led the United States to choose a
policy of calculated ambiguity. The policy of calculated
ambiguity does not deny the United States the positive
deterrence attributes that nuclear weapons provide. The
policy of calculated ambiguity may even advance the
deterrence goals of the United States by providing an
element of uncertainty in the mind of any potential
adversary considering a CBW attack. While it maintains the
potential of a U.S. nuclear response to CBW attack,
calculated ambiguity avoids many of the negative aspects of
relying on nuclear weapons, because it does not specifically
state that nuclear weapons would be used in response to a
CBW attack. The ambiguity of the policy makes it difficult
for critics of nuclear weapons to "pin down" the U.S.
policy. Thus, many of the criticisms .that would be provoked
by an explicit reliance on a nuclear option for
counterproliferation are avoided.
Retaining the positive aspects of nuclear weapons while
avoiding many of the negative implications intrinsic to an
explicit reliance on nuclear weapons may make the policy of
calculated ambiguity appear to be the policy of the owl —
64
wise and knowing. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Instead, unless other dispositions have been made out of
public view, the strategy appears to be that of the ostrich
— avoiding a dilemma by sticking one's head in the sand. In
this case, the dilemma is whether to obtain the benefits of'
a counterproliferation strategy with a significant nuclear
option, or to gain the benefits of upholding a policy of no-
nuclear-use against non-nuclear weapons states. Both
options inflict costs as well as offer benefits. Calculated
ambiguity is an attempt to "have one's cake and eat it too,"
thus avoiding the costs and gaining the benefits. By
choosing both, neither has been chosen. It is quite
possible that instead of receiving the benefits and avoiding
the costs, significant costs could accrue to the United
States in a crisis.
The policy of calculated ambiguity also exposes the
United States to criticism over the contradiction between an
implicit reliance on nuclear weapons to deter CBW attacks
and the negative security assurances given in support of the
NPT. These contradictions are not desirable; however, given
the disadvantages of explicitly choosing either of the
alternatives, the United States can accept them.
65
If the policy of calculated ambiguity is ever tested by
an adversary's CBW attack, decision-makers who rely on this
policy of calculated ambiguity will face a difficult choice.
For the first time, they will have to decide whether it
would be more important to obtain the benefits of using
nuclear weapons in response to such an attack, or whether
the negative aspects of a nuclear response would outweigh
any gains. Pressures on national decision-makers may lead
to an unwise snap decision, resulting in damage to the
national interest.
Such damage is not inevitable, even with a policy of
calculated ambiguity. The United States can continue to
publicly invoke a policy of calculated ambiguity. To do so,
however, the senior leaders of the United States must
consider ahead of time the circumstances that might prompt
the use of nuclear weapons. The studies and discussions
that support such reflections must not become public, lest
they undermine deterrence. They need not even be official.
What is important is that the officials advising the
President soberly consider a range of scenarios and options
in an atmosphere conducive to judicious strategic thinking.
It is hoped that this actually is the case today, and that
66
the United States has indeed adopted the policy of the owl
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